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Abstract: The corporate finance literature for market reaction to 
dividend announcements reports mixed results: some of studies support 
a positive response of markets as a result of dividend announcement 
whereas some report negative. This study is an attempt to investigate 
the heterogeneous market reaction to dividend announcement for 73 
firms listed in the Karachi Stock Exchange. We investigated this 
phenomenon with a novel methodology using both the event study and 
multivariate regression for the possible effects of firm-specific factors 
associated with dividend announcements. We report that the market 
reaction is one-sided as the majority of companies in the sample are with 
positive CAR for the given period. We cannot ignore the importance of 
firm-specific factors that have an effect on the dividends but we conclude 
that the majority of companies in the sample period portray a positive 
CAR and the market reaction is positive. 
Key Words: Dividend Announcement, Cumulative Abnormal Returns, 
Firm-specific Factors, Market Reaction 
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1 Introduction 
Investors are always interested in optimizing their earnings and 
continuous search of optimal investments on the basis of technical and 
signalled information. Healthy dividends depict the profitability of the 
company and good investments made by the management.  The 
relationship of dividend and stock prices has been under debate of most 
researchers. Dividend announcement conveys the information about the 
future earnings of the company, i.e. it conveys a signal to the investors of 
how the firm will perform in the future. One of the common assumptions 
is that market is not efficient, whereas the dividend information content 
sends a signal to investors. The finance literature has proved that the 
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stock prices of a company change after the announcement of dividends 
(Bhattacharya, 1979, 1980; John & William, 1985; Miller & Rock, 1985). 
Managers intentionally or unintentionally send a message to external 
investors about the pattern of firm’s future earnings and value by 
announcement of cash dividends (Miller & Modigliani, 1961). Most of 
researchers have focused on the influence of earning information on 
stock dividends by applying the event study to capture the possible 
effect. Jin (2000) suggested that there may be other firm-specific factors 
affecting the stock prices other than dividend announcements.   
The concept which explains the relationship of stock price and information 
content of dividend is given by the dividend signalling theory proposed by 
Miller and Rock (1985), free cash flow theory (Bhattacharya,1979,1980; 
John & William,1985; Miller & Rock, 1985), free cash flow hypothesis 
given by Jensen (1986) and Agency Cost theory forwarded by 
Easterbrook (1984). The discussion in these theories mainly states that 
changes in firms dividend policy significantly affects the share prices of 
the respective firm. The dividend announcement, which might be a result 
from any of the three theories, acts as a transmitting channel which 
signals the future earnings of the firm to investors. Higher dividend 
figures represent the strength of the company in the context of producing 
higher earnings in future and vice versa. Indirectly, when a firm 
announces higher dividends, the stock prices of the company will also 
increase - this statement has been substantiated by the mixed empirical 
results in literature of e.g. Jin (2000); Mitra & Owers (1995);  Healy & 
Palepu (1988). The dividend announcement plays a role as a signal to 
investors; in case of a dividend increase it portrays a positive signal that 
future earrings will increase, while a decrease gives a negative signal to 
investors that future earnings will deteriorate. Basically, it is the way of 
communication or a channel via which the firm communicates with the 
investors this was first identified by Cooper et al. (2001), who explained 
various ways in which firms communicate with investors some of which 
are earning announcements and dividend announcements.   
This paper is an attempt to investigate empirically whether the stock 
prices change after the announcement of dividends. Does the information 
content hypothesis given by Miller & Modigliani (1961) holds for Pakistani 
firms? Furthermore, the main objective will be to check the relationship 
of firm-specific factors and whether the dividend announcement is 
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influenced by these factors. This study has significance for both the 
corporate manager as well as for the investor. The managerial 
importance of this study lies in the relationship of a positive dividend 
announcement and the firm value. As we have stated, the management 
can portray positive signals to investors by announcing high dividends. 
Higher dividends are seen as the best managerial application of skills and 
investing in optimal and positive NPV projects leading to higher yields, 
which creates a healthy perception in the minds of investors that the firm 
is moving towards shareholder wealth maximization and value creation. 
The investigation proceeds in two ways. We are applying diverse 
methodology in terms of the event study by incorporating firm-specific 
factors which enhance the robustness of the empirical results of the event 
study. Using the event study methodology alone would lead to spurious 
results due to the association of firm-specific factors which might distort 
the actual findings. Secondly, the sample is divided into two groups: first, 
the full sample is considered, then it is divided into two groups having 
positive and negative CAR, for the possible effect of firm-specific factors. 
This paper is structured into five sections. Immediately following 
Introduction in Section 1 is Section 2, which outlines valuable literature in 
this area. Section 3 describes the nature of data and methodology. 
Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 contains 
concluding remarks regarding the results in section 4. 
2 Literature review 
The dividend announcement and its common perception in the minds of 
investors are often debated in the corporate finance literature. In 
literature, we found both supportive and contradictory views of the 
information content of dividends. Fama (1970) applied the efficient 
market hypothesis to stock market and divided the information efficiency 
in three categories; a weak form of efficiency, a semi-strong form of 
efficiency and a strong form of efficiency. He further explained how the 
information is reflected in stock prices. A similar concept is found in 
studies like Keith Cuthbertson (2005); Reilly (2006). A contradictory side, 
like Miller and Modigliani (1961), investigated this concept and concluded 
that the dividend announcement has no impact on the firm returns and 
the dividend information content hypothesis is irrelevant. They further 
argued that this phenomenon has no impact on stock prices of firms 
Financial Assets and Investing  
 
10 
under the assumption that the market is perfect and firms invest with 
fixed schedule. Rubinstein (1976) tested this context and concluded that 
the dividend information content is neutral and it has nothing do with the 
increase or decrease of the stocks return. Kamstra (2000) supported 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) and concluded that the dividend 
announcement has nothing to do with the change in prices of the stock. 
Gordon and Shapiro (1956) provided an view opposing that of Miller 
(1961) - they concluded that the dividend announcement significantly 
affects the stock prices and firm returns. Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) 
studied this phenomenon and concluded that it seems that the current 
dividends are affecting the future dividend changes and stock prices. 
Similarly, a more recent study, Deangelo and Deangelo (2006), found 
that the information content of dividends is highly relevant. 
A lot of researchers (Healy and Palepu, 1988; Nissim & Ziv, 2001; 
Michaely et al., 1997;  Dyl & Weigand, 1998; Grullon et al. 2002;  Koch & 
Sun, 2004;  Fargher & Weigand, 2009) agree that the information 
content of dividends has a significant impact on stock prices. They used 
the CAR to conduct the analysis. They found a positive and significant 
relationship between the CAR and profitability of the firm and its stock 
prices. What they fail to reject is that there is a negative relationship 
between the CAR and risk. Frankfurter and Wood (2002), Bozos, 
Nikolopoulos and Ramgandhi (2011) studied the phenomenon in two 
steps. First, the authors developed the CAR, and second, they regressed 
the CAR on various sets of variables. They concluded that the firm 
produced a positive and significant CAR at the announcement dates. In 
the second part, they found a significant and positive relationship 
between managerial ownership variable and information content of 
dividend. They found all firm specific variables significant and positive in 
relationship with CAR. Other studies (Boehem & Sorescu, 2002; Brav et 
al, 2005; How, Ngo & Verhoeven, 2011) tested the reaction of market 
investors to dividend announcements. The stock prices increased and 
they validated the signalling theory. Fama (1969) studied the 
phenomenon and concluded that the information content of dividend is 
significant. The dividend gives a signal to market investors about the 
future trends of stock prices moving. The study divided the data into 
positive and negative abnormal return and analysed them in the form of 
the event study. The significant positive CAR confirmed a positive 
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response of market to dividend announcements. The overall results are in 
accordance with the information content of dividend hypothesis that the 
market investor can get a positive or a negative signal as a response of a 
dividend announcement. In an additional study, utilizing quarterly 
information, Pettit (1972) suggested that dividends convey sufficient 
signals to market investors. But the question is how the market takes 
time to adjust the signal to represent the true efficiency; if the signal that 
is sent to the market in the form of dividend is efficient and how much 
time it would take to adjust with the true value of stocks. He suggested 
that the dividends convey signal in excess of what the market perceives. 
Bhattacharya (1979), holding the perfect information efficiency, claimed 
that investors have capability to assess the inner news of firm. They use 
various tool to assess the firm profitability, risk and real worth of 
business. The management uses the dividends as a signalling tool to give 
the signal about the real worth of the firm to the external market.   
John and Williams (1985), Miller and Rock (1985), the slightly updated 
and modified versions of the dividend information content hypothesis, 
were incorporations of the cash flow concept. The dividend 
announcement affects the cash flow in near future or present. This 
activity is intentional in nature; however, management do this by 
incurring some cost to give a signal to market investors and 
shareholders. Jensen (1986) suggested that the free cash is the main 
determinant of the stock prices increase and decrease in the case of 
information content of dividend. The dividend would be paid in the case 
of free cash flows where the cash is in excess of the cash required for the 
investment projects. The abnormal response of stock prices would only 
be observable when there is an unexpected dividend announcement. 
Easterbrook (1984) incorporated the agency cost concept into the 
phenomenon. He argued that keeping the shareholder separated from the 
management concept sometimes encourages misuse of funds by the 
management. In the context of agency theory hypothesis, the reaction of 
stock prices would be negative when dividend announcement occurs. The 
research yielded somewhat interesting results regarding the dividend 
initiation and dividend omission. Studies like Mitra and Owners (1995) 
argued that that the increased dividend announcement has a positive 
effect on the stock returns. The study by Eades and Kim (1985) 
suggested that the decreasing dividend announcements have a negative 
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impact on the stock returns. The emerging markets like Malaysia reacted 
the same as in the study of Mitra and Owners (1995); Hess and Kim 
(1985).  They concluded that the increasing dividend has a positive and 
decreasing dividend has a negative effect on the stock prices. Kao (1994) 
studied the unexpected dividend announcements and information content 
of dividend and concluded that dividend information sends significant 
signals to market investors. Further, he suggested that the management 
take valuable information to confirm their expectations in future and 
present scenario. 
3 Data and methodology 
The data is obtained from Balance Sheet Analysis files (BSA) compiled by 
the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) Statistics and DWH department. Firm-
specific variables data is obtained by the BSA files, the stock prices data 
is taken from Business recorder for 73 companies on the basis of final 
dividend announcement dates in the year FY011. The methodology is 
divided into two parts: the first is to estimate the cumulative abnormal 
returns using the event study to find out whether there is any effect of 
the dividend announcements on the stock prices of the firms, these test 
are suggested by Thompson (1985); Johnston, (2007). The abnormal 
returns are calculated by expected returns by the market model; the 
equations follow:  
 ݎ௘ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅	ߜଵ ݎ௠  (1) 
ܥܣܴ௧ ൌ ∑ ܣܴ௞௧଴௧ିଵ    (2) 
Where for equation (1) ݎ௘ is the expected return,	ߙ0 is the intercept or 
constant, ݎ݉  is the return of market and ߜଵ is the slope. After this step 
we calculate the abnormal returns and the cumulative abnormal returns 
as in equation (2) and consider the event pre and post window to be 60 
and 10 days respectively to identify the effect of such announcements on 
the firm's stock prices. The second part of the methodology is to check 
whether the CARs (calculated in equation 3) calculated are effected by 
any other firm-specific factors; for this purpose firm-specific factors are 
incorporated which will enhance the robustness of the empirical results of 
the event study. If only the event study methodology was applied, the 
results would be spurious due to the association of other factors which 
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might distort the actual findings. Secondly, we divide the sample into two 
groups: first the full sample is considered, then it is divided in two groups 
having a positive and negative CAR, for the possible effect of firm-specific 
factors. The regression equation will be as follows 
ܥܣܴ௜ ൌ 	ߙ଴ ൅	ߜଵܼܵܧ௜ ൅ ߜଶܧܸܱܮ௜ ൅ ߜଷܮܧ ௜ܸ ൅ ߜସܦ ௜ܻ ൅ ߜହ ܮܫܳ௜ ൅ ߝூ݅  (3) 
Where "݅" is the cross-section, ߙ଴ is the constant and ߜଵ,
ߜଶ, 	ߜଷ, 	ߜସ, 	ߜହ	are the coefficients of the explanatory variables. ܥܣܴ௜		is 
dependent variable for i firms.  
3.1 Specifications of firm specific variables 
In the equation above, the explanatory variables are SZE which is the 
size of the firm. Similarly to Viswanath et al. (2002), we define the firm 
size as the natural logarithm of market capitalization; empirical work of 
Mougoue and Rao (2003) and Alpa and Dhanni (2005) document a 
reverse relationship between firm size and dividend payout. The EVOL is 
the volatility which is measured by the standard deviation of stock 
returns as studied by Rubin and Smith (2009), firms with net income 
more volatile distribute more dividends in order to send a good signal to 
outside investors - the relationship is expected to be positive; less 
volatile firms will be inferred as having a steady stream of cash flows 
leading to consistent dividends as compared to more volatile ones. 
LEV is the leverage ratio of the firm. It is calculated as total liabilities as a 
percentage of shareholders equity, the signal is expected to be positive 
which may be due to two different aspects under the agency theory and 
signalling theory. According to Borokhovich (2005), the higher ratio leads 
to meeting financial liabilities which reduces funds for distribution. 
According to Ross (1977), the higher the debt ratio the more will be the 
firms value increased. DY is the dividend yield of firms, which is 
calculated as the total amount of dividend as a percentage of 
shareholders equity, the relationship with stock prices is ambiguous and 
may be positive or negative as documented by Belden, Todd and Knapp 
(2005) as well as Easstons and Sinclair (1989). LIQ is the liquidity of the 
firm; it is calculated as cash in hand divided by total assets; the firms 
having high liquidity are considered to give more dividends so the 
expected signal is hypothesized to be positive. It is hypothesised that if 
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any of the explanatory variables is positively or negatively significant in 
equation 2, it can be deduced that it is not only the information content 
of dividend that affect cumulative abnormal returns but also other factors 
whichever is significant in equation 3. 
3.2 Chow Test 
The latter part is to check if there is any difference between the firms 
having negative and positive CARs. On this basis the firms will be divided 
in two groups consisting of the whole sample. The CHOW test will be 
applied to check whether there is any significant difference between the 
above mentioned subgroups. 
ܨc ൌ ሺௌௌ௙ିௌௌ௣ିௌௌ௡ሻ/௞ሺௌௌ௣ାௌௌ௡ሻ/ሺேିଶ௞ሻ (4) 
where ݂ܵܵ is the sum of square residuals of full sample, ܵܵ݌ is the sum 
of square residuals of positive sample and ܵܵ݊ is the sum of square 
residuals of negative sample. 
4 Results 
We have applied the event study methodology to calculate the cumulative 
abnormal return of all companies. As we have used 73 companies for the 
analysis, we could not report the table of cumulative abnormal returns. 
For the sake of brevity the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) table is not 
reported. The CAR has both positive and negative significant values as 
shown in figure 4.1. The positive and significant values of the event study 
before the event (Dividend announcement) indicate that the investors 
speculate on an increase in the future prices of stock and are engaged in 
speculative activities. For some companies, the CARs were negative after 
the event of announcement of the dividends, which indicates the stock 
returns have decreased after the announcement of the dividends. Some 
companies that report positive and significant CAR after the dividend 
announcement are consistent with the idea that the stock prices 
increases as dividends are announced. For the sake of further analysis, 
the CAR are categorized as a full sample and further into two subgroups. 
The first category includes CAR of all companies. We report it as full CAR 
"F". The second group includes the positive CAR of all companies and we 
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report it as positive CAR "P". The third category includes the negative 
CAR as we report as negative CAR "N" in Table 4.1 and Table 4.2. For 
each category of CAR, we have estimated the separate equation where 
we kept the CAR as the dependent variable and firm-specific variables are 
independent variables. We report the multivariate cross sectional 
regression results in table 4.1 and table 4.2. 
Before discussing the basic results of the multivariate regression model, 
we present the overall explanatory power of the model and overall 
significance of the model. We report the two important elements as R-
squared values and F-statistics. The values reported in the bottom of 
table 4.1 and 4.2 are the R-squared values. The R-squared value in the 
case of all regression is comparatively low; however, the good thing is 
that the model is overall significant as the F-statistics reported are 
significant in all cases of regression equation.  
Figure 4.1 Pictorial presentation of average CARs of firms 
 
Source: authors' processing 
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Table 4.1 Results of Multivariate Cross-Sectional Regressions  
for CAR 1, 2 and 4 
 Variable CAR 1 
  F P N 
 SZE -0.0037 0.0532 -0.0332 
  (0.2340) (0.5610) (0.1940) 
 EVOL -0.0453 -0.0651 0.0014 
  (0.055)** (0.1940) (0.5610) 
 DY 0.1350 -0.2510 -0.0392 
  (0.023)*** (0.2624) (0.1497) 
 LEV 0.3020 -0.0146 0.1340 
  (0.3185) (0.0897)* (0.2931) 
 LIQ 0.0144 -0.0346 -0.0022 
  (0.050)** (0.058)** (0.3924) 
 R2 24.63% 13.97% 17.30% 
 F-STAT 4.4170 2.8160 3.4210 
 CHOW     10.0168*** 
 Variable CAR 2 
  F P N 
 SZE -0.0335 0.0113 -0.0017 
  (0.1352) (0.2370) (0.3215) 
 EVOL -0.0016 -0.0020 0.0035 
  (0.3215) (0.4891) (0.2931) 
 DY 0.0231 -0.3126 0.0163 
  (0.054)** (0.098)* (0.2561) 
 LEV 0.2310 0.0018 0.0632 
  (0.3215) (0.2163) (0.2763) 
 LIQ 0.0772 -0.1555 0.0233 
  (0.051)** (0.6145) (0.2340) 
 R2 27.35% 35.12% 14.17% 
 F-STAT 4.8650 3.7690 2.6250 
    CHOW        7.963*** 
 Variable CAR 4 
 F P N 
SZE -0.0039 0.0002 -0.0161 
 (0.1314) (0.2163) (0.2931) 
EVOL -0.0020 -0.0017 -0.0032 
 (0.3215) (0.2579) (0.2693) 
DY 0.0295 -0.5630 0.1680 
 (0.051)** (0.057)** (0.1790) 
LEV 0.0231 0.0024 0.1320 
 (0.053)** (0.1213) (0.2459) 
  LIQ      0.0169    -0.0054 -0.0022 
     (0.5610) (0.1940) (0.1352) 
  R2     15.62% 26.30% 27.31% 
 F-STAT    3.4230 2.3150 4.4360 
 CHOW   7.134***   
P-values are clustered in parenthesis*,** and*** indicates values at 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level. F, P & N in the second row of column are the Full, Positive and Negative 
CAR respectively. 
Source: authors' processing 
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4.1 Results of Multivariate Cross-Sectional Regressions  
for CAR 1, 2 and 4 
The results reported in table 4.1 show that the variable earnings volatility 
EVOL is negative and statistically significant at 5% percent level for CAR1 
F only, which indicates that the firm whose earnings volatility is lower 
conveys the maximum information to investors about the future earnings 
and dividends of firms which as a result increase the stock prices and the 
returns.  For the rest of the regressions we found no significant 
relationships between the earnings volatility and cumulative abnormal 
returns. The results reported in table 4.1, the coefficients of size variable 
SZE in all cases are statistically insignificant. Whatever the signal, we 
cannot make any conclusions from such results. The statistically 
significant and positive coefficient of the dividend yield DY for CAR2 F, at 
5% level, indicates that after the dividend announcement the investor 
has good news and as a better event to respond, the stock prices have 
increased; as a result, the investors yield higher returns. In the case of 
CAR2 P and CAR4 P, the coefficient is negative and significant at 5% 
level. It can be deduced that that investor feels bad about the dividends 
and predicts future dividends to be lower. As a result, the stock prices 
decline and affect the returns adversely. These results are consistent with 
Wansley et al. (1991); Lee & Yan (2003); Gurgul et al. (2006); Dasilas & 
Leventias (2011). 
However, the Leverage variable LEV has a positive and significant 
coefficient for CAR2 P and CAR4, F at 5% level, meaning that higher the 
debt ratio, the more the firm is willing to give healthy dividends; it could 
be interpreted in the signalling theory perspective that the firm being 
highly levered signals its value increasing which would obviously in return 
increase the firm profitability leading to healthy dividends. The liquidity 
ratio variable LIQ has positive and significant coefficients for CAR1 F and 
CAR2 F at 5% level, which indicates that if the firm has sufficient liquid 
assets it would contribute to higher investors’ wealth. In the case of CAR1 
P the coefficient is negative and significant at 5% level meaning that the 
firms having liquidity problems are less capable to pay dividends 
minimizing the shareholders wealth, so it could be inferred that the more 
liquid the firm is, the more finely it is positioned to announce dividends. 
The shareholders can pressure the management to do so in the case that 
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the firm has free cash after investing in a project and vice versa in the 
case of low liquidity.  
Table 4.2 Results of Multivariate Cross Sectional Regressions  
for CAR 6, 8 and 10 
Variable CAR 6 
 F P N 
SZE -0.0020 0.0079 -0.0246 
 (0.1940 (0.6123) (0.2473) 
EVOL -0.0023 -0.0040 0.0077 
 (0.0311)*** (0.5610) (0.1940) 
DY 0.0247 -0.6320 0.1820 
 (0.5012) (0.0583)** (0.3924) 
LEV 0.0222 0.0436 -0.0412 
 (0.1621) (0.3456) (0.4481) 
LIQ 0.0138 -0.0440 0.0101 
 (0.6126) (0.3694) (0.4891) 
R2 37.88% 8.23% 33.71% 
F-STAT 7.681 1.926 4.291 
CHOW     8.236*** 
Variable CAR 8 
 F P N 
SZE -0.0751 0.0056 -0.0363 
 (0.3215) (0.4891) (0.2931) 
EVOL -0.0039 -0.0027 0.0037 
 (0.1352) (0.2218) (0.3215) 
DY 0.0361 -0.4310 0.0316 
 (0.0517)** (0.6145) (0.2340) 
LEV 0.0351 0.0539 0.0378 
 (0.1863) (0.2371) (0.2712) 
LIQ 0.0284 -0.0036 0.0248 
 (0.2931) (0.1231) (0.1352) 
R2 41.21% 9.23% 36.45% 
F-STAT 5.274 1.642 3.218 
CHOW      9.2163*** 
Variable CAR 10 
 F P N 
SZE -0.0914 0.0007 -0.0086 
 (0.5610) (0.2579) (0.2340) 
EVOL -0.0017 -0.0073 0.0016 
 (0.1314) (0.2163) (0.2931) 
DY 0.0614 -0.4220 0.0763 
 (0.5610) (0.1940) (0.1352) 
LEV 0.0637 0.0096 0.0516 
 (0.4618) (0.1523) (0.1455) 
LIQ 0.0489 -0.0084 0.0230 
 (0.1314) (0.2163) (0.2473) 
R2 38.26% 6.13% 23.43% 
F-STAT 4.139 1.637 3.161 
CHOW    7.856*** 
P-values are clustered in parenthesis*,** and*** indicates values at 10%, 5% and 1% 
significance level. F, P & N in the second row of column are the Full, Positive and Negative 
CAR respectively. 
Source: authors' processing 
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The chow test is reported in the bottom of table 4.1 and table 4.2, which 
are presented to check the difference of the two groups with negative 
and positive CAR. The results reject the null hypothesis (the two groups 
are similar), which indicates that the information content of dividend is 
validated. In literature we find such evidence when the response of 
negative or positive CAR is not due to the firm-specific factors but due to 
the information content of dividend (Jin, 2000). 
4.2 Results of Multivariate Cross-Sectional Regressions  
for CAR 6, 8 and 10 
The results reported in table 4.2 show that the variable earnings volatility 
EVOL is negative and statistically significant at 5% percent level for CAR6 
F only, which indicates that the firm whose earnings volatility is lower 
conveys the maximum information to investors about the future earnings 
and dividends of firms which as a result increases the stock prices and 
the returns.  For the rest of regressions we found no significant 
relationship between the earnings volatility and cumulative abnormal 
returns. The statistically significant and positive coefficient of the 
dividend yield DY for CAR8, F at 5% level indicates that the dividend 
announcement gives the investor good news as a better event to 
respond, and stock prices have increased as a result of the investor 
taking the high returns. In the case of CAR6 P and CAR4 P, the coefficient 
is negative and significant at 5% level. It can be deduced that that 
investor perceives the negative information about the dividends and 
predicts future dividends to be lower as a result, the stock prices declines 
and hence affect the returns adversely. 
5 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the information content of dividend by employing 
the event study methodology to check the effect of dividend 
announcement on stock returns.  Furthermore, to check the relationship 
CAR with firm-specific factors, we employed the multivariate cross-
sectional regression keeping the CAR as the dependent variable. The 
three separate equations for categories of CAR for the whole sample, 
positive CAR and negative CAR are estimated. We report mixed results of 
the event study, the positive and significant effect of dividend information 
on some company returns, which seems to mean that the investors take 
this event as good news and we found an increasing trend of dividends. 
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However, in some companies CAR is statistically negative and it seems 
that the dividend announcement has a negative impact on stock prices. 
The result of the multivariate cross sectional regression is mixed; 
however, the result of the chow test confirms that the information 
content of dividend holds for the sample companies for the given sample 
period of analysis and Pakistani companies respond positively to the 
dividend announcement as a whole. The results are in accordance with 
the studies conducted by several authors such as Wansley et al. (1991); 
Lee & Yan (2003); Gurgul et al. (2006); Dasilas & Leventias (2011). 
The overall results incline us to reject the Miller & Modigliani (1961) 
hypothesis which does not hold for Pakistani firms. The concepts of 
Jensen (1986) regarding free cash flow and Easterbrook (1984) for 
agency costs concept explain this phenomena in a much more 
understandable way: retention of free cash flows and over investment in 
projects could lead to a negative reaction creating a feeling of resentment 
in shareholders’ minds or cause agency problems which might lead the 
managers to satisfy their own personal self interest in the form of perks 
and benefits, etc. 
So far the results we reported clearly indicate the importance of dividend 
announcements on stock prices but still there are a lot of reasons which 
might affect these announcements in the form of stock splits, stock 
repurchases etc. These factors can be used as future directions of 
research heading this way.  
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